The capacity to imagine and prepare for alternative future possibilities is central to human cognition. Recent research suggests that between age 2 and 4 children gradually begin to demonstrate a capacity to prepare for two simple, mutually exclusive alternatives of an immediate future event. When children were given the opportunity to catch a target an experimenter dropped into an inverted Y-shaped tube, 2-year olds-as well as great apes-tended to cover only one of the exits, whereas 4-year-olds spontaneously and consistently prepared for both possible outcomes. Here we gave children, age 2 to 4 years, and chimpanzees a different opportunity to demonstrate potential competence. Given that social behaviour is particularly full of uncertainty, we developed a version of the task where the outcome was still unpredictable yet obviously controlled by an experimenter. Participants could ensure they would catch the target by simply covering two tube exits. While 4-year-olds demonstrated competence, chimpanzees and the younger children instead tended to cover only one exit. These results substantiate the conclusion that the capacity for simultaneous preparation for mutually exclusive event outcomes develops relatively late in children and they are also in line with the possibility that our close animal relatives lack this capacity.
Introduction
The capacity to imagine diverse future events and prudently adjust current behaviour accordingly is a hallmark of human cognition [1, 2] . Given that there are typically multiple ways in which future events might unfold it can be beneficial to prepare for more than just one eventuality. So people make contingency plans and hedge their bets as they navigate their environment. Yet little is known about when these capacities develop in children [3] [4] [5] and to what extent they are shared with non-human animals [6, 7] . Recently, a minimalist paradigm has been introduced to give young children and great apes an opportunity to demonstrate this most basic capacity [8] . Subjects were presented with an inverted Y-shaped forked tube and the experimenter dropped a target into the top that could be caught coming out of one of the two exits (missed targets rolled out of reach). Most 4-year olds spontaneously and consistently prepared for both possibilities by placing their hands under both exits. This unswerving success demonstrates that they have the basic capacity to simultaneously prepare for alternative event outcomes. In contrast, all the 2-year olds as well as the chimpanzees and orangutans covered only one of the exits on the first trial-as did most 3-year olds-and even those who eventually covered both exits often regressed to covering only one on subsequent trials.
Failures are difficult to interpret as there are usually reasons other than the cognitive capacities in question that may have limited performance [6] . However, we can provide subjects with multiple opportunities to demonstrate the capacity in ways that minimize other demands. For instance, subjects in this task may have been confused about what causally happens at the juncture where the tube forks into two exits (they could not know that an internal platform and hidden screw allowed the experimenter to determine where the target exited). Here we therefore aimed to provide a simple, visible and unambiguous (yet still unpredictable) causal mechanism that determined where the target would exit. Furthermore, given that the social world harbours many uncertainties, especially if other agents have plans of their own, it is possible that the capacity is more readily observable in such a context. Some research suggests that while young children and apes show similar skills when dealing with physical problems, children display more sophisticated capacities when dealing with problems in the social world (e.g. [9] ). Thus, one might expect young children but not apes to improve in performance when the contingencies of the task are clearly controlled by another agent, rather than some non-social mechanism, as in the previous study. We therefore decided to give children and chimpanzees the opportunity to demonstrate a basic capacity to prepare for two simple, mutually exclusive possible outcomes of a future event in a social game in which the experimenter simply dropped the target into one of two parallel tubes. We also tested five chimpanzees at the Rockhampton Zoo. These included three subjects that had participated in the original forked tube study ('Cassie' a 43-year-old male, 'Holly' a 26-year-old female and 'Samantha' a 31-year-old female) and two new group mates who to our knowledge had not participated in any prior psychological research ('Leakey' a 21-year-old female and 'Alon' an 8-year-old male). Subjects were presented with a simple two tube apparatus (see figure 1) and were given the opportunity to catch a target (a ball or a grape) that the experimenter dropped into one of the tubes. A mesh fence prevented subjects from merely following the position of the target with their own hand (except for Cassie, who was tested in a different area and had free movement of his hands). Instead, they had to place one or both hands through the mesh under one or both tube exits. If they did not catch the target it fell on a ramp and rolled out of reach. At the beginning of each trial, the experimenter held the item in a position above and in between the two tubes before rapidly moving the hand to either the left or the right tube and immediately dropping it inside. This action happened quickly enough that it was not possible for the participants to simply wait for the experimenter to move and then react by covering the appropriate exit to catch the target. Prior to the test phase subjects completed a demonstration phase in which they could see the item fall from the exits (but not catch it) in a pseudorandom order for six trials. During the test phase, subjects had the opportunity to catch the item for 12 trials, as it fell from the exits in a pseudorandom order. Further methodological details are outlined in the electronic supplementary material.
Material and methods

Results
All but one 2-year old prepared for only one possible outcome on the first trial, but with increasing age children were more likely to cover both exits on this trial, CochranArmitage x 2 ð1Þ ¼ 5:19, p ¼ 0.023. Children's (and chimpanzees') overall performance is summarized in figure 2 .
A series of generalized estimating equations (GEE) analyses was conducted to compare children's performance across age groups and all 12 trials (see electronic supplementary material for full details). The best fitting model contained a significant linear effect of age on covering both exits, generalized-score (GS) x 2 ð1Þ ¼ 7:74, p ¼ 0.005, but it did not contain a linear trial effect or an interaction between trial and age. Older children were also significantly more likely to cover both exits on at least one trial, Cochran-Armitage x rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org Biol. Lett. 13: 20170170
here. However, as 40 of these cases came from four 4-year-old children, this behaviour did not drive the overall pattern of age-related performance increase (and in fact it may have artificially deflated the performance levels of the 4-year olds).
None of the chimpanzees covered both exits on the first trial, or indeed on any of the 12 trials (figure 2). These subjects included Samantha and Holly, who had covered both exits on at least some later trials in the previous study [7] , so there was no sign of a carry-over effect. Instead, the chimpanzees tended to cover one exit and so obtained a reward on about half of the trials. However, the two subjects that lacked experience with psychological testing frequently reached towards the location where the experimenter was holding the grape before the trial, instead of covering either of the exits. We therefore administered extra trial blocks to these two subjects after a further training phase. Subsequently, both subjects regularly covered one exit and Alon even covered two exits on four occasions, although he regressed to covering one exit on following trials (see electronic supplementary material for further details). Such a response pattern was observed also in some of the children (figure 2), as well as in the great apes and children that participated in the previous study [7] .
Discussion
The current study found that, in a social game, the capacity for simultaneous preparation for mutually exclusive event outcomes was evident in children around age 4. Few 3-year olds and one 2-year old also demonstrated competence, but the other children and chimpanzees did not. This pattern of results is similar to the recent finding with the forked tube task [8] and suggests that difficulties understanding the causal mechanism were not responsible for poor performance in the original study. Subjects in the current study were able to observe why the target was going to come out of the exit it did come out of (i.e. they saw the experimenter drop it into the relevant tube), yet they had to prepare for the possibility that the experimenter dropped it in either one of the tubes if they wanted to be certain about catching it. However, presentation of the problem in this arguably more ecologically valid, social context did not improve performance levels: neither on the first trial nor subsequently; and neither for chimpanzees nor for young children who in other contexts outperformed chimpanzees on social tasks [9] .
The fact that some children and, on subsequent later trials, one chimpanzee covered both exits demonstrates that they are physically capable of the optimal response, even if they subsequently regressed to covering only one exit. This may reflect subjects being weakly conditioned into using the two-handed response through trial-and-error learning rather than insightful preparation for two mutually exclusive versions of the future. The first trial and consistent successes of many older children, on the other hand, strongly suggest they are capable of such deliberate preparation for an uncertain future.
In contrast to our postulation that the current task may be easier to pass than the original forked tube task [8] because the causal mechanism is visible, unambiguous and social, we found that the children performed worse (see electronic supplementary material for a cross-study statistical analysis). One possibility is that they may have perceived the task as a social game in which they were required to guess, rather than 'cheat' by covering both exits. This seems unlikely, however, considering that children's conformity to implicit rules against cheating generally increases with age [10] , whereas here we found that older children were more likely than younger children to cover two exits. Although we cannot say for certain why the children performed worse on this version of the task, one possibility is that young children's mental representations of others' intentions (as in the current task) may be stronger than their representations of physical possibilities (as in the forked tube task), leading them to be more committed to their initial prediction of the experimenter's action. Another possibility is that children are more likely to commit to a single possible outcome when the mechanism controlling the outcome is obvious (cf. [3] ). More research is required to clarify the reasons for differential performance levels, for instance using similar tasks where the Cumulative percentages of children (across age groups) and chimpanzees categorized according to when they covered two exits across all 12 trials. Blue bars indicate participants that covered two exits on the first trial and all subsequent trials. Green bars indicate participants that did not cover two exits on the first trial, but did so on a later trial and subsequently maintained that response across trials. Yellow bars indicate participants that covered two exits at some stage but regressed to covering one exit on a later trial. Red bars indicate participants that did not cover two exits on any trial.
rsbl.royalsocietypublishing.org Biol. Lett. 13: 20170170 outcome is certain rather than uncertain. Perhaps there are other contexts in which subjects can perform well and so more studies with different versions of such tasks are needed to give children and animals further opportunities of demonstrating competence if they have it. Although we cannot conclude that chimpanzees and young pre-schoolers are not capable of conceiving of and preparing for mutually exclusive possibilities per se, repeated failure on diverse versions of such tasks makes such an explanation increasingly likely. Similarly, having established competence in older preschoolers across several studies and contexts increases the likelihood that by that stage of development this becomes part of normal cognitive maturation. However, thus far we have only tested children in Australia who may be regarded as 'WEIRD' (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) [11] , and work with children from other cultural backgrounds is required before conclusions about human universality are warranted [12] .
In conclusion, the current results show that many 4-yearold children are capable of preparing for two mutually exclusive alternative actions of a social agent, just as they are capable of preparing for multiple possible outcomes of a future event caused by a hidden, non-social mechanism [7] . We could find only limited evidence for this capacity in younger children and no evidence in a sample of chimpanzees. These results support the possibility that there is a genuine difference in how older children consider uncertain future events compared with both younger children and our closest living animal relatives. The difference could lie, for example, in the capacity to metarepresent: that is, in the capacity to reflect on the fact that representations of possible future events (e.g. experimenter drops ball into the left tube) could be incorrect, and that therefore it is worth preparing for other possibilities (e.g. experimenter drops ball into the right tube) as well [7, 8] . The present results are consistent with more general developmental changes in future-oriented behaviour around age 4 [13] and also with the proposal that certain elements of foresight may be uniquely human [6] .
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